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Technology choices and growth: testing New Structural Economics
in Transition Economies
Randolph Luca Bruno, Elodie Douarin, Julia Korosteleva and Slavo Radosevic*
School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, London, UK
We explore the relationship between development policies, ﬁnance and growth as
approached by New Structural Economics (NSE) with special reference to Transition
Economies (TEs). On a sample of 164 economies for 1963–2009, our analysis
conﬁrms NSE propositions that the type of development policies, as captured by the
Technology Choice Index (TCI), has a signiﬁcant effect on long-term growth.
However, this differs for TEs as a whole and its subgroups. Further to this, using a
sample of 94 countries for 1985–2009, we provide a ﬁrst empirical test of the rela-
tionship between growth, TCI and ﬁnancial structure distortions and we show that
there is a negative relationship between ﬁnancial distortions and TCI on the one
hand and medium-term growth on the other hand. We also ﬁnd that the negative
effect of a higher ratio of TCI on medium-term growth is partly mitigated, although
not eliminated, by moderate level of ﬁnancial sector distortions. This points towards
some positive externalities of simultaneous ﬁnancial and industrial sector distortions,
at least in the medium run. However, TEs are shown to differ from the rest of the
sample as ﬁnancial distortions play a more pronounced direct negative effect on
medium-term growth in these countries.
Keywords: New Structural Economics; Technology Choice Index; Transition
Economies
1. Introduction
We propose to test and expand the basic propositions of New Structural Economics
(NSE) theory, with special reference to Transition Economies (TEs). NSE essentially
builds on neoclassical theory through its recognition of comparative advantages and the
importance of structural change for growth (Lin 2012, 2015). It emphasizes that the
economic structure of an economy is endogenous to its factor endowment structure and
that sustained economic development is driven by changes in factor endowments and
continuous technological innovation. In other words, it posits that growth patterns
reﬂect whether a country’s institutional and policy environment favours technological
upgrading in sectors which are compatible with the country’s comparative advantage,
given its initial endowment structure. Accordingly, NSE distinguishes between com-
parative advantage following (CAF) and comparative advantage defying (CAD) strate-
gies with countries following CAF strategies argued to be more likely to grow ceteris
paribus. This forms interesting premises on which to analyse development strategies
and their relative success or failure.
Lin (2012) empirically tested his proposition using Technology Choice Index (TCI)
as an indicator of the strategy followed by a given country. TCI is constructed as the
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value added to labour ratio in manufacturing over the total value added to labour force
ratio in the country. The assumption is that a high TCI ratio captures an inadequacy
between a high value-added manufacturing sector and a relatively backward “rest of
the economy”. For example, soft and hard infrastructure is missing to generate a bal-
anced and sustainable growth. In other words, over-investing in an excessive capital or
forcing productivity through costly R&D when a country is below the sufﬁcient level
of development will entail a distorted strategy that will not be sustainable in the long
run. Lin’s analysis conﬁrmed a negative relationship between long-term growth and
TCI for a sample of 122 countries over the period 1963–1999. In this paper, we are
able to test Lin’s propositions on a much larger sample and over a longer time span.
Further to this, Lin (2012) also pointed out that high level of distortions is also
associated with ﬁnancial distortions. We take this proposition further to explore the
direct effect of ﬁnancial distortions and TCI on medium-term growth, accounting for
potential endogeneity, as well as a possible moderating effect of ﬁnancial distortions on
the relationship between TCI and growth.
Additionally, we explore the effects of TCI on growth and its links to ﬁnancial dis-
tortions in the context of TEs speciﬁcally. In conventional perspective, TEs were con-
sidered paragons of distortions and big push industrialization followed by strong post-
socialist deindustrialization. In itself, this represents an interesting case for testing the
propositions of NSE and how a shift from distortionary to less distortionary environ-
ment affects economic growth.
We organize the paper as follows. First, we brieﬂy discuss the basic propositions of
NSE–TCI and CAD/CAF and how they relate to the development literature and the
literature on socialism and post-socialist transition. Second, we discuss the likely rela-
tionship between TCI, ﬁnancial structure and growth. Third, we present our sample,
discuss the construction of the TCI index and the data series used. Fourth, we present
our regressions investigating the relationship between TCI and growth. Fifth, we dis-
cuss our exploration of the associations between ﬁnancial distortions and TCI with fur-
ther implications for growth. Our key ﬁndings are summarized in conclusions.
2. Development strategies and technology choice
2.1. Overview of development thinking since the 1950s
Old structuralism has emerged in development thinking in the 1950s in the writings of
early structuralists including Lewis (1954) or Prebisch (1959, 1960). It posited that
low-income countries faced fundamentally different problems from more industrialized
economies. Accordingly, trade along the traditional lines of comparative advantage
offered little hope for industrialization while the developed economies would block any
effort to gain a foothold in the market for manufactured goods. These ideas inﬂuenced
development policies during the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s, in particular through
import substitution strategies (see Radosevic 1999 for an assessment of these policies).
These ideas contrasted sharply with the view advanced by orthodox economists, who
saw the causes of differences between advanced and developing economies as primarily
rooted in differences in the amount of capital per unit of labour and the resulting labour
productivity. Both groups of countries could increase their income per capita by the
same means, and relatively independently, provided that they removed policy
distortions and followed their comparative advantage.
132 R.L. Bruno et al.
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By the mid-1980s, many developing countries entered into debt crisis, discrediting
import substitution strategies. This led to a radical shift in policy thinking. Industrial
targeting, subsidized credit for speciﬁc subsectors and detailed technology transfer reg-
ulations were no longer seen as recipes for development. Instead, the International
Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the US Treasury begun advocating the policies
that became known as the “Washington Consensus” (Williamson 1990, 2004). They
involved balanced budgets, liberalization of interest rates, competitive exchange rates,
trade and FDI liberalization, privatization, deregulation, etc. These were then followed
by the so-called “augmented Washington consensus” policies, which added focus on
institutional reforms towards improved corporate governance, anti-corruption policies,
ﬂexible labour markets and so forth. However, Washington Consensus-based policies
lost their relevance after the severe output losses observed during transition in the for-
mer Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and the sustained rapid growth observed in
China, India and Vietnam (World Bank 2005). This should not have happened, as
China, India and Vietnam were said to pursue more interventionist policies and liberal-
ize in a gradual and heterodox manner, while TEs were abandoning central planning
and attempting to apply reforms complying with the Washington Consensus.
Within this context, NSE emerged as a third way in development thinking, reinstating
the importance of economic structure and industrial upgrading. However, in contrast with
the old structural economics thinking of the 1950s, the “structure” is endogenous in NSE.
To some extent, the aim of NSE is to marry structural approach to growth with neoclassi-
cal economics, and as such it is based on (a) an understanding of comparative advantages
as the evolving potential of a country’s endowment structure, (b) a reliance on the market
as allocation mechanism at any stage of development and (c) the recognition of a facilitat-
ing role of the state in the process of industrial upgrading (Lin 2012). A country will grow
economically if it does dynamically follow a strategy compatible with its comparative
advantage.
2.2. NSE, TCI and growth
The basic idea that growth is spurred when a country follows a development strategy
consistent with its comparative advantages and endowment structure is intuitively and
theoretically appealing. It is, however, difﬁcult to test. Indeed identifying a proxy cap-
turing whether a development strategy falls into a CAD or CAF category is challeng-
ing. Lin and Liu (2004) proposed to use a TCI.
This indicator is deﬁned as follows:
TCIi;t ¼ AVMi;t=LMi;tGDPi;t=Li;t (1)
where AVMi;t is the added value of manufacturing industries of country i at time t,
GDPi;t is the total added value of country, LMi;t is the labour in the manufacturing
industry and Li;t is the total labour force.
A high TCI value is therefore indicative that a country follows a CAD strategy by
investing in capital-intensive manufacturing. The numerator of TCI will be relatively
larger in context where manufacturing ﬁrms have large market shares, thanks to
government’s intervention, where access to subsidized credit and inputs, and supernormal
proﬁts lead to heavy investment into capital and where therefore the added value
generated by the sector is above what would be generated otherwise. Simultaneously, less
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labour will be employed in such a distorted sector as capital-intensive technologies will
be favoured, further inﬂating the value added to labour ratio in the supported sector.
This indicator therefore captures a situation where a government tries to kick-start
economic growth through policies supporting a capital-intensive manufacturing sector.
Such an indicator of distortion is reminiscent of the policies that were advocated from
the 1950s onward, when interventionism was the rule and development planning, pro-
tectionism and investment subsidies were thought to be the keys to economic growth.
Lin (2012) has convincingly demonstrated, using a sample of 122 countries over
the period 1962–1999, that higher TCI over a 10-year period (i.e. long-term implication
of a CAD strategy) is associated with lower average growth rate and a greater volatility
in growth performances. Such a ﬁnding conﬁrms the strong dominance of targeted
interventionist views in the greater part of the period covered by the study and the fail-
ure of such an approach to produce growth. However, the existence of a strong rela-
tionship between high TCI and low growth may masks more subtle variations within
the sample of countries investigated. In particular, the negative relationship between
TCI and growth may not be generally valid but can be conﬁned to speciﬁc groups of
countries or to speciﬁc income levels. To expend on Lin’s work, we revisit his ﬁnding,
using a longer time period, and different sub-sample of countries.
2.3. TCI and TEs of Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of
Independent States
TEs constitute a very relevant subset of countries for exploring and testing the CAD/
CAF propositions of NSE. As command economies they tried by political means to
achieve fast industrialization, giving preference to heavy industry and within it to
machinery and steelmaking (Kornai 1992). By implementing forced growth, the priority
sectors grew very fast at the expense of consumer goods and services. However, these
priority sectors proved capable of promoting growth only in the medium term, thus
conﬁrming the model of dual economy developed by Lewis (1954) hitting the limits of
extensive growth driven by practically unlimited supply of labour or capital (Kornai
1992). This therefore highlights a key difference between NSE and the principles of
socialist industrialization or related theory of unbalanced growth (Hirschman 1958;
Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1989). Indeed, while socialist industrialization was based
on the belief that a few “driving sectors” could pull ahead and their excess demand
would encourage other sectors to catch up, NSE posits that this will only be possible if
these “driving sectors” truly reﬂect the endowment structure of the country and its
potential comparative advantage. On that basis, TEs were following what could be
described as strong CAD strategies, and following the logic of Lin (2012), one would
expect the TCI ratio for these countries to be high at the onset of transition and pro-
gressively decreasing as they adopted more market-oriented policies. However, the
evolution of the manufacturing sector in TEs during transition proved more complex.
Indeed, manufacturing and heavy industry were actively promoted under central
planning, but simultaneously, government also aimed at maintaining full employment,
through labour hoarding and hidden unemployment. Under such circumstances, the
total value added generated by the manufacturing sector was possibly greater than
would have been achieved without intervention, but the hoarding of labour into the sec-
tor brought down the value added per worker, reducing the value of the numerator of
TCI. Through the combined pressure of these two opposing forces (heavy investment
in capital-intensive manufacturing bringing TCI up, and labour hoarding bringing TCI
134 R.L. Bruno et al.
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down), it is clear that the extent of distortion in these countries at the onset of transition
cannot be appropriately captured by TCI.
Furthermore, with the collapse of communism, the countries of CEE and the CIS did
restructure away from heavy industry, as shown by Raiser, Schaffer, and Schuchhardt
(2004). However, the pace of deindustrialization differed across countries and while
CEEB countries have retained a relative share of employment in industry above bench-
mark market economies, the European CIS countries (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus) were
shown to have kept an excessively large industrial sectors, while the poorer southern
and Asian CIS countries reached levels of industrial employment that are at or even
below the market economies benchmark (ibid.). It is also important to bear in mind that
the degree of over-industrialization differed across countries during socialism, and even
with large investment, the productivity of the manufacturing sector of these countries
remained low due to systemic misallocation of resources and lack of incentives. Addi-
tionally, and as formalized by Aghion and Blanchard (1994) with the so-called “optimal
speed of transition”, the restructuring of these economies would only be possible with
a substantial increase in unemployment. This has taken place in all countries but with
quite different speed.
As a result, in the early stages of transition, the total value added per worker gener-
ated by the manufacturing sector could have increased, decreased or stayed the same,
depending on the speed and extent of deindustrialization, the spend and extent of
labour shedding and the production efﬁciency gains. Therefore, the combined impact of
these factors means that the move away from a CAD strategy as observed in the speci-
ﬁc context of TE is unlikely to be captured through a decreasing TCI ratio. Overall,
TCI is not an appropriate indicator of the extent of distortion in the speciﬁc case of
transition countries.1
3. Financial structure distortions
Further to this, the CAD and CAF strategy cannot be assessed in an institutional vac-
uum (Lin, Sun, and Jiang 2011; Lin 2015), as a CAD strategy requires substantial gov-
ernment interventions. Lin (2012) provides evidence of an association between TCI and
government interventions in property rights institutions, resource allocation, enterprise
autonomy, and the existence of a black market, suggesting that higher values of TCI
are positively associated with the presence of such distortions in the economy. We
focus on ﬁnancial structure.
Government intervention in the ﬁnancial sector hinders efﬁcient resource allocation.
Financial restriction measures were typically part of an “inward-oriented” development
strategy from the late 1950s and were enacted to protect local ﬁrms from foreign com-
petition. Maintaining interest rates below equilibrium level aimed to promote growth in
selective industries through directed lending. An undervalued exchange rate made
imports relatively more expensive than domestically produced goods. Capital controls
prevented inﬂows of foreign capital and ensured an increase in domestic investment
favouring a shift towards capital-intensive manufacturing.
Empirical research overwhelmingly shows that ﬁnancial constraints have a negative
impact on ﬁnancial deepening and economic growth (Fry 1995, 1997; Levine 2005).
They crowd out high-yielding investments, creating disincentives to save and generally
inhibit ﬁnancial sector development and growth. But there is also anecdotal evidence
that moderate ﬁnancial distortions can have a positive effect on growth, as in South
Korea in the 1960s where it seemed that they were addressing market imperfections,
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such as high interest rate margins in imperfectly competitive banking (for an overview
of this literature see Korosteleva and Lawson (2010)).
In the late 1970–1980s, many developing countries started liberalizing their ﬁnan-
cial sectors. Later, ﬁnancial liberalization, embodied into the “Washington consensus”,
spread to TEs, where ﬁnancial systems inherited from a planned economy were
regarded as underdeveloped and inefﬁcient; stock markets were not existent, and
ﬁnance, in general, played a rather passive role, serving as a monetary counterpart of
an enterprise’s output and input.
The crucial role played by the size of ﬁnancial system in the growth process is well
established (see Levine 2005). However, recent evidences have focused on the impor-
tance of ﬁnancial structure for growth. More speciﬁcally, scholars argue that while both
banks and securities markets positively inﬂuence economic development, they provide
different services critical at different stages of economic development (Levine 2002) as
a result, different combinations of ﬁnancial institutions and markets are needed at
different development stages (Boyd and Smith 1998).
For NSE, ﬁnancial structure is endogenous. Speciﬁcally, a CAD strategy requires a
sub-optimal ﬁnancial structure which fails to deliver the appropriate blend of ﬁnancial
services but contributes to supporting targeted sectors (e.g. Lin and Xu 2012). This has
further deleterious effects on economic activity. Demirgüç-Kunt, Erik, and Levine
(2011) show that deviation of a country’s actual ﬁnancial structure from its estimated
optimal level, regardless whether such a deviation arises because the country is “too”
bank-based or “too” market-based, is associated with lower rates of growth.
A deviation of the actual ﬁnancial structure away from its optimal level, in any
direction, represents ﬁnancial sector distortion and greater ﬁnancial sector distortions
should be reﬂected in high values of TCI with further adverse consequences for
growth. It is particularly interesting to explore this relationship in the context of TE, as
an important task of transition was to create a ﬁnancial system independent from the
state and able to ﬁnance viable projects and support economic change (De Melo and
Denizer 1997).
4. Data, methodology and hypotheses
4.1. TCI index
The data come from World Bank Development indicators database (WDI) for 1960–
2010 and United Nations Industrial Statistics database (UNIDO) for 1963–2009. TCI is
deﬁned as per formula (1), where value added and employees in the manufacturing sec-
tor are obtained from UNIDO, while gross value added and labour force size in country
i at time t are from WDI. Both value added in manufacturing and gross value added
are measured in current prices and local currency.
We use TCI data for 164 countries as Burundi, Rwanda, Madagascar, Burkina Faso,
Nigeria had TCI representing statistical errors and were removed from the sample.
The regressions exploit 10 years averages (decades 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and
2000s), the dependent variable being growth of GDP per capita (at US PPP constant
prices) and the key independent variable being TCI.
4.2. Indicators of ﬁnancial structure gap
Drawing on Demirgüç-Kunt, Erik, and Levine (2011), we deﬁne ﬁnancial structure as a
ratio of private credit to stock market capitalization. It is a commonly used size-based
136 R.L. Bruno et al.
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measure of ﬁnancial structure. To capture distortions in the operation of the ﬁnancial
sector, we construct a measure of ﬁnancial structure gap, which captures how far a
country’s actual ﬁnancial structure is from an estimated optimum. This optimal ﬁnancial
structure is estimated as in Demirgüç-Kunt, Erik, and Levine (2011). We ﬁrst regress
our size-based measure of ﬁnancial structure on GDP per capita at constant US$ 2000
for the sample of OECD countries2 for the period 1985–2009, while controlling for key
institutional, geographic and structural traits. This assumes that OECD economies are
least ﬁnancially distorted, and therefore, conditional on the aforementioned controls,
they provide benchmark information on how the optimal ﬁnancial structure varies with
economic development. The ﬁnancial structure ratio for OECD economies is estimated
based on robust regression given the sensitivity of our results to outliers. We then use
the coefﬁcients from the OECD regression to compute the estimated optimal ﬁnancial
structure for each country-year observation in the full sample. The ﬁnancial structure
gap is equal to the natural logarithm of the absolute value of the difference between
the actual and the estimated optimal ﬁnancial structure, or it is approximated by the
logarithm of the predicted residuals for each country-year.3 The results of the robust
regression for ﬁnancial structure ratio estimated based on the OECD sample are
available from Bruno et al. (2014).
4.3. Hypotheses
Our hypotheses are aiming to test the robustness and validity of key NSE propositions,
namely (1) we want to test the negative relationship between TCI and growth on an
extended data set, and on speciﬁc subgroups of countries, looking in particular at TEs
and (2) we want to test the NSE assertion that ﬁnancial structure and TCI affect growth
more speciﬁcally by investigating whether ﬁnancial structure distortions have any direct
(independent from TCI) and moderating effect on the relationship between TCI and
growth, while accounting for their potential endogeneity. Table 1 summarizes our
hypotheses.
5. TCI and growth
5.1. Overview of the data
Our database of 164 countries from 1963 to 2009 covers the whole spectrum of
development phases with the shares of low-, middle- and high-income countries (HIC)
accounting for 17, 53 and 30%, respectively.4 TEs, as key focus of our study, account
for 18% of the sample.
Focusing on TE, we want ﬁrst to describe the observed patterns of TCI change.
Unfortunately, for most TE countries, data points are only available for the 1990s and
2000s (with the notable exception of Hungary, which is characterized by low distortion
throughout). We are therefore unable to discern the full evolution of TCI from the
communist era to the present day. But the data available do show interesting patterns
for the transition period. It appears that TEs experienced low-level distortions as mea-
sured through TCI overall and in particular at the onset of transition (TCI below 2).
Some countries (mostly CIS) experienced a rise in TCI in the following decades. This
evidence is in line with our discussion on the relevance of TCI as proxy for economies
with substantial labour hoarding.
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5.2. Econometric results: base model
We now test the robustness of Lin’s (2012) results on our extended sample. We test if
the growth rate of the GDP pc (constant 2000 US$) is affected by the level of distor-
tion in the economy as proxied by TCI. For this, we estimated three models analogous
to those presented by Lin (2012) in table VI.4., but with 459 and 418 observations
instead of 315 and 278, respectively. The data are rearranged in 10-year averages
(decades) to smooth out the business cycle.
In the regressions in Table 2, we included controls that are analogous to those
found in Lin’s regressions, namely the natural logarithm of TCI, the natural logarithm
of GDP at the start of the period, a measure of institutional set-up (legal origins for our
models, and a rule of law indicator and institution indicator for Lin’s), distance to equa-
tor, a measure of trade openness, population size at the start of the period, and indicator
taking the value one for landlocked countries and 0 otherwise. These regressors are
used to ensure that our regressions are as close as possible to Lin’s speciﬁcations. We
then added population growth and average years of schooling (Barro Lee), two vari-
ables that are absent from Lin’s models but which are standard growth regressors.5
Controlling for human capital in particular seemed quite important in the light of recent
evidences showing that it is a more robust determinant of growth than institutions
(Glaeser et al. 2004).
Model 1a in Table 2 presents a minimal speciﬁcation including only TCI and GDP
at the beginning of the period, Model 1b includes all the controls listed above and
Model 1c also includes time ﬁxed-effect (decades dummies). Again this is to be consis-
tent with the results presented by Lin (2012).
In the three models presented in Table 2, the coefﬁcient on TCI is negative and sig-
niﬁcant which suggest that greater distortions, as measured by a higher TCI value, are
Table 1. Hypotheses.
Type of relationships Hypotheses
(1) TCI & growth H1.1: On average, a high value of TCI is negatively related to
long-term growth
H1.2: Transition Economies (TEs) differ from the rest of the
sample: it is less likely that a negative relationship between TCI
and growth will be identiﬁed for them, and we expect some
further differences to be identiﬁed for CEEB vs. CIS in the way
TCI relates to growth
(2) Financial distortions,
TCI and growth
H2.1: On average, a higher value of TCI and ﬁnancial structure
gap will independently adversely affect medium-term growth
H2.2: A moderate increase in the deviation of the actual ﬁnancial
structure from its estimated optimal level (in either direction
regardless whether a shift occurs towards a more bank-based or
market-based sector) will positively moderate a negative effect of
TCI on growth in the medium run
H2.3: In Transition Economies, ﬁnancial sector distortions are
expected to have a more pronounced negative effect than in the
rest of the world; and their effect to be stronger than the TCI
effect in this region. However, we also hypothesize that given
enterprise restructuring, and entry of new ﬁrms, a moderate
increase TCI, possibly attributed to efﬁciency gains as a result of
industrial restructuring, is likely to have a positive moderating
effect on FSG-growth relationship
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associated with lower growth. This supports our hypothesis H1.1, conﬁrming Lin’s
(2012) ﬁndings for a longer period and for a larger number of countries.
5.3. Econometric results: TEs
To go further, we augment the base models with an interaction term of the log of TCI
and a transition countries dummy. Models 2a, b and c of Table 3 are reproducing the
speciﬁcations of models 1a, b and c of Table 2, respectively, but including these two
new variables. This allows us to test whether there is a different relationship between
TCI and growth in the context of TEs, as we posited. We ﬁnd that the interaction terms
between the log of TCI and a transition countries dummy is always positive and signiﬁ-
cant, irrespective of the speciﬁcation chosen (see models 2a, b and c), the coefﬁcient is
also greater than the coefﬁcient estimated for log of TCI in all speciﬁcations. This
means that the overall effect of TCI on growth in the sub-sample of TEs is positive.
We also ﬁnd that the TE dummy is signiﬁcant and negative in models 2b and c, proba-
bly capturing the severe output losses of the transitional recession.
Table 2. Estimating the effect of TCI on growth: robust regression results.
Dependent variable: growth rate of GDP pc
(constant 2000 US$) Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c
Ln TCI −0.011*** −0.007*** −0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Ln_gdp_pc_start −0.004*** −0.007*** −0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Ln_PopulationTotal start 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001)
Distance to equator 0.006 0.011
(0.008) (0.008)
Landlocked −0.004 −0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
Population growth −0.755*** −0.395***
(0.094) (0.117)
Ln Average years of schooling Barro Lee 0.004 0.010***
(0.003) (0.003)
Trade Openness 0.013*** 0.014***
(0.002) (0.002)
Legal origin_uk_laporta 0.003 0.000
(0.004) (0.004)
Legal origin_fr_laporta 0.005 0.003
(0.004) (0.004)
Legal origin_sc_laporta 0.008 0.005
(0.006) (0.005)
Constant 0.062*** 0.024 0.013
(0.009) (0.015) (0.015)
Decade (time) ﬁxed effects No No Yes
Observations 459 418 418
Adjusted R2 0.076 0.262 0.316
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses.
Source: World Bank Financial Structure Data-set (2012), WB WDI 2012 edition; UNIDO.
*Denotes signiﬁcance at the 10% level, respectively.
**Denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level, respectively.
***Denotes signiﬁcance at the 1% level, respectively.
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Growth and TCI are positively correlated in TEs suggesting that higher distortion in
terms of TCI enhances growth in the transition region: at ﬁrst sight, a puzzling results
for supporters of NSE. However, we should bear in mind that: (a) the TCI has to be
used with caution in the context of TEs due to different speeds of de-industrialization,
(b) TE itself is an heterogeneous region and we should distinguish between CEEB and
CIS countries.
Table 3 therefore shows a further effort to disentangle the speciﬁcities of the rela-
tionship between TCI and growth in TEs, through the use of two separate sets of
dummy and interaction term for CEEB and CIS countries, respectively. Models 3a, b
and c show regressions where we decompose the effect in the aforementioned groups
of countries. In these regressions, the negative effect of TCI on growth is conﬁrmed
overall, but models 3b and c show that the interaction term between TCI and a CEEB
dummy is positive, signiﬁcant and large compared to the coefﬁcient measuring the
effect of TCI on growth for the whole sample, while the interaction term between TCI
and a CIS dummy is negative, insigniﬁcant and small compared to the coefﬁcient mea-
suring the effect of TCI on growth for the whole sample. Based on Model 3c, we can
report the overall effect and signiﬁcance of TCI on growth for CEEB, CIS and the rest
of world to be, respectively, +0.010 (signiﬁcant at 5%), −0.012 (signiﬁcant at 10%)
and −0.007 (signiﬁcant at 1%).
In line with hypothesis H1.2, CEEB and CIS countries exhibit a relationship
between TCI and growth that is distinct from what is estimated for the rest of the
world. Countries in the CEEB group show a positive relationship between TCI and
growth, whereas for the CIS, this relationship is negative and of a greater magnitude
than what is observed for the rest of the world. These results are signiﬁcant as they
suggest something fundamentally different in the way distortions, as measured through
TCI, relate to growth in these countries. To explain this, we suggest ﬁrst, that the type
of policies pursued prior to transition in these countries were highly distortive, but
maybe not in a way that is appropriately captured through TCI. This is because during
the socialist era, these countries were both over-investing in capital-intensive manufac-
turing and hoarding of labour. During transition, the tension between the need to reduce
the size of a capital-intensive sector and to shed labour would have imposed opposing
forces on TCI making it difﬁcult to predict the likely evolution of this indicator and
invalidating its ability to measure the extent of distortions in TEs.
Second, this puzzling result can also be related to high level of investments in sup-
portive infrastructures (education, transport, energy, etc.) which may have helped
growth to bounce back faster during transition. In the longer term, the comparative
advantage of TEs may have caught up with the ambitions of their planners (Carlin,
Schaffer, and Seabright 2013). In fact, it seems that those CEEB countries that have
been able to maintain a larger manufacturing sector had better chances of recording
higher growth, while the CIS countries, where industrial restructuring is not yet com-
pleted, recorded lower growth. Additionally, the evidences gathered on the economic
recovery of TEs after the transitional recession have pointed towards the importance of
swift reforms allowing for resource reallocation across sector, a process that is facili-
tated by the availability of skilled labour, and the ability to attract FDI inﬂows, and
integrate into global value chains (Campos and Coricelli 2002). From this perspective,
CEEB also had the advantage of being located closer to the EU which offered an
institutional template and a friendly economic partner able to absorb the CEEB’s
manufacturing products and to provide funds and technical support (Di Tommaso,
Raiser, and Weeks 2007). Further to this, in the Kaldorian tradition, manufacturing has
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been argued to have a special role in pulling economies forward and generating growth,
while deindustrialization has been linked to poor growth performances and reindustrial-
ization has been shown to be difﬁcult (Tregenna 2009, 2011). In this context, it is
possible that in the period of rapid and drastic change that followed the fall of commu-
nism, countries that were able to build up on their excess capacity and attract further
investments may have done better than those where deindustrialization has occurred
and slow restructuring has not yet reached an optimum.
5.4. Further results: different subgroups of countries6
As discussed previously, most TEs exhibited relatively low TCI at the onset of transi-
tion and therefore did not represent highly distorted economies based on this index. To
further investigate the relationship between TCI and growth, we examine a group of
countries for which TCI appears as a well-suited measure of distortion. We deﬁne as
highly distorted those economies that belong to the top decile of TCI in our data series
(TCI values above 10). These highly distorted economies are typically low-income
African economies, where islands of manufacturing operate in largely agricultural
economies. As before, we reproduced the Model 1c presented in Table 2 adding a
dummy for highly distorted economies and an interaction term with TCI and this
dummy and found that for highly distorted economies the effect of TCI on growth is
signiﬁcant and negative (−0.004), while the coefﬁcient estimated for the effect of TCI
on growth for the rest of world is insigniﬁcant. This result conﬁrms that highly dis-
torted economies where small capital-intensive manufacturing pockets are artiﬁcially
created do not achieve sustained growth.7 This result conﬁrms the validity of a key
NSE proposition, in context where distortions are appropriately captured through TCI.
In a further attempt to explore the validity of the views formalized in NSE, we
re-estimated our basic models on a sample of middle-income countries (MIC) and a sam-
ple of HIC.8 This exercise reveals a negative and signiﬁcant relationship between TCI
and growth for MIC (−0.008, signiﬁcant at the 1% level in a model analogous to
Model 1c) and a positive relationship between TCI and growth for HIC (+0.010, signiﬁ-
cant at the 1% level in a model analogous to Model 1c). This conﬁrms the validity of
NSE for MIC on average, but a different story may be at play for HIC. A plausible ﬁnd-
ing, as HIC tend to be characterized by large and expending tertiary sectors, while the
composition of their manufacturing sector is likely to differ from that of MIC. This also
conforms with Lee and Kim (2009) and Lee (2013) who defend that different develop-
ment strategies and policies are required at different stages of economic development. To
the extent that CEEB countries were typically HIC by the end of the period for which we
have data, while most CIS remained MIC, our general results on HIC vs. MIC can
contribute to explaining the results we found for CEEB country in the previous section.
6. Financial structure distortions, TCI and growth
6.1. Financial structure gap and TCI
We continue our examination of key NSE propositions through the investigation of the
relationship between ﬁnancial structure distortions, TCI and growth. Due to data limita-
tions, the time span on which we base our investigations is 1985–2009 (instead of
1963–2009 in Section 5) and we focus on midterm growth (5-year period) rather than
long-term growth (10-year period).
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We ﬁrst report indicator of ﬁnancial development and structure for the whole
sample, and some groups of countries. Economies worldwide remain predominantly
bank-based with the median for actual ﬁnancial structure ratio equal to 1.93 in our sam-
ple. This is even higher for TEs, where the median of the actual ﬁnancial structure ratio
reaches 3.25.
The ﬁnancial structure gap in our sample ranges from −2.46 in Norway to 5.84 in
Bulgaria. OECD economies, which were used as a benchmark to create the optimal
ﬁnancial structure, show the lowest gap (−0.41) in the sample.
As regards TEs, they are more ﬁnancially distorted than the average country with a
group median at 1.04 compared to 0.81 for the rest of the world. The ﬁnancial structure
gap is higher in CIS than CEEB economies, but the difference is not substantial. Bul-
garia emerges among the most ﬁnancially distorted countries with the ratio of actual
ﬁnancial structure being in excess of the optimal ﬁnancial structure (based on the coun-
try mean) by a factor of 19 (in line with the severe ﬁnancial crisis that hit the country
in 1997). Among relatively more ﬁnancially distorted countries are Armenia, Croatia,
Kyrgyzstan and Latvia. They would all beneﬁt from developing stock markets vis-à-vis
private credit. On the contrary, Russia appears distorted in the opposite direction, hav-
ing a relatively over-sized stock market. Otherwise, the rest of TEs in our sample
appear still relatively ﬁnancially underdeveloped, especially in terms of private credit to
GDP.
Turning to the association between TCI and Financial Structure Gap, our explora-
tory analysis reveals that the two are highly and positively correlated for the whole
sample (see Figure 1). This is not surprising as ﬁnancial sector distortions usually
accompany other factor market distortions in industries deﬁned by authorities as
strategically important. Financial distortions typically are complemented by a form of
price controls and wage increase policies, restrictions on import–export operations and
ﬁscal policy envisaging various tax concessions for “strategic” enterprises (see
Korosteleva and Lawson 2010). However, it is less clear whether such a complemen-
tary-effect matters in explaining economic growth, and whether TEs exhibit any
differences from the rest of the world in the effect of TCI and FSG on growth. We
explore this next.
6.2. TCI, ﬁnancial distortions and growth
We now investigate the relationship between TCI, ﬁnancial structure gap and growth.
We aggregate data in 5-year averages from 1985 to 2009 for 94 countries, so that we
have a maximum of ﬁve observations per country, allowing us to explore the effects of
TCI and ﬁnancial structure gap on medium-term growth. Along with TCI and ﬁnancial
structure gap, we also introduce their interaction term to test for a potential moderating
effect of ﬁnancial structure gap on the TCI-growth relationship. Finally, we look at
these relationships for TEs.
We use the following model to examine the effect of TCI and FSG on growth:
dLnGDPpc realit ¼ b1LnGDPpc realit1 þ b2Xit þ b3Zit þ uit
i ¼ 1; . . .;N ; t ¼ 1; . . .; T
uit ¼ vi þ eit (2)
144 R.L. Bruno et al.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 L
on
do
n]
 at
 06
:28
 18
 Ja
nu
ary
 20
16
 
where dLnGDPpc_realit is the rate of change in the GDP pc (at US PPP constant
prices), LnGDPit−1 is the initial level of GDP pc (at US PPP constant prices) with
respect to each 5-year period of time (predetermined variable). Xit is a vector of poten-
tially endogenous variables, namely TCI, FSG, and their interaction, trade openness
and population growth. Zit is a vector of strictly exogenous control variables consistent
with our analysis in Section 5. The error term uit consists of the unobserved country-
speciﬁc effects, vi and the observation-speciﬁc errors, eit. We also control for time ﬁxed
effects across all our speciﬁcations.
The dynamic structure of Equation (1) makes both the OLS and ﬁxed effects
estimators upwards and downwards biased, respectively, and inconsistent, since the
predetermined variable and endogenous variables are correlated with the error term.
Therefore, to estimate Equation (1), we use the System Generalized Method of
Moments (SYS GMM) estimator (Arellano and Bond 1991; Arellano and Bover 1995;
Blundell and Bond 1998). This allows us to address econometric problems which arise
from estimating Equation (1). These include (a) the problem of potential endogeneity
of regressors; (b) the presence of predetermined variables – the initial level of GDP pc
(in US PPP constant prices) that gives rise to measurement error as it is correlated with
past errors; (c) the presence of ﬁxed effects which may be correlated with the regres-
sors; (d) the ﬁnite sample. SYS GMM allows the predetermined and endogenous
variables in levels to be instrumented with suitable lags of their own differences (in this
instance of order one and higher).
The results obtained pass necessary diagnostic tests: (a) the autocorrelation test
shows that the residuals are an AR (1) process which is what is expected. The test
statistic for second-order serial correlation is based on residuals from the ﬁrst-difference
equation and it rejects the null hypothesis of serial correlation of the second order;
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Figure 1. The relationship between TCI and Financial Structure Gap, country averages
(median).
Source: World Bank Financial Structure Data-set (2012 edition), UNIDO; The data are plotted
based on the exact observations used in the SYS GMM estimation of the growth-TCI-FSG
relationship (Table 4).
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(b) the instrument set is valid as evidenced by the Hansen test of over-identiﬁed restric-
tions; and (c) all variables of interest have expected signs.
Our results reported in column (1) in Table 4 suggest that both TCI and FSG have
a direct negative effect on growth, with the effect of TCI being relatively stronger.
Table 4. SYS GMM regression results: Estimating the effect of TCI and ﬁnancial structure gap
on medium-term growth.
Explanatory variables (1) (2)
Ln_gdp_pc_start −0.010** −0.010**
(0.004) (0.004)
Ln_population_start 0.005*** 0.003**
(.001) (.001)
Population growth −0.113 −0.073
(.117) (.177)
Ln TCI2 −0.017* −0.006
(0.009) (0.008)
FinStr gap −0.005* 0.000
(0.003) (0.003)
Ln TCI_x_FinStr_gap 0.005** 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Landlocked −0.005 −0.007
(0.007) (0.006)
Distance from equator 0.004 0.028
(0.015) (0.019)
Legal origin UK −0.002 −0.006
(0.009) (0.011)
Legal origin France 0.000 −0.004
(0.009) (0.01)
Legal origin Scandinavia 0.005 −0.005
(0.011) (0.010)
Average years of schooling 0.016 0.022*
(0.011) (0.013)
Trade openness 0.012** 0.013**
(0.005) (0.005)
TE – −.004
(.015)
TE_x_FinStr gap – −.008*
(0.004)
TE_x_TCI2 – −.035
(.027)
TE_x_FinStr gap_x_TCI2 – .025
(.018)
Time ﬁxed effects Yes Yes
Number obs. 331 331
F st. 16.12 23.84
Pr > z AR(1)/Pr > z AR(2) 0.00/0.62 0.00/0.63
Hansen test of over-identiﬁcation restriction, χ2 (Pr. > χ2) .293 .931
Source: World Bank Financial Structure Data-set (2012 edition), WB WDI (2012 edition); UNIDO. Notes:
Dependent variable: growth (approximated by the difference in logarithms of real GDP pc at US PPP dollars
at current period and previous period), averaged over 5-year non-overlapping periods of time. Level of sta-
tistical signiﬁcance is * 0.1%, ** 0.05% and *** 0.01%. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to
heteroskedasticity. The ﬁgures reported for the Hansen test and Difference Hansen test are the p-values for
the null hypothesis: valid speciﬁcation. Note: the autocorrelation test shows that the residuals are an AR (1)
process which is what is expected. The test statistic for second-order serial correlation is based on residuals
from the ﬁrst-difference equation.
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However, the negative effect of TCI on growth is reduced by a moderate increase in
FSG, implying positive complementarities. This is illustrated in Figure 2 where the
marginal effect of TCI on growth conditional on ﬁnancial distortions is plotted against
FSG. When ﬁnancial structure deviations are fairly moderate (as shown on Figure 2 in
the section to the left of the graph delimited by two vertical red lines), there is a small
compensating effect of FSG on the negative relationship between TCI and growth. At
higher values of FSG, the marginal effect of TCI is statistically insigniﬁcant, and the
turning point is found when FSG is equal to −0.51).
Expanding our analysis to TEs (column 2 of Table 4), we show that ﬁnancial dis-
tortions matter more for TEs compared to the rest of the world, supporting intuitions
based on exploratory analysis of the data. Indeed, the ﬁnancial sector has undergone
unprecedented transformation in this region during the period of investigation. In the
ﬁrst transition decade, it remained overly bank-based with banks being overexposed to
the problem of bad debts through lending to failing afﬁliated enterprises or, under ofﬁ-
cial pressure, to loss-making state-owned enterprises. This resulted in ﬁnancial crises in
the majority of TEs by the mid-late 1990s (e.g. banking crises in Latvia and Lithuania
occurred in 1995, Bulgaria, Romania and Czech Republic – 1996–97, Russia – 1998).
This is also consistent with the literature on ﬁnancial development and growth in
TEs. For example, Koivu (2004) found an inverse relationship between bank credit to pri-
vate sector and growth in a sample of 26 TEs, explaining these results by the negative
relationship between quality of credit stock and its size, focusing on the period 1993–
2000, when many TEs, particularly of the CIS region, continued allocating bank loans to
inefﬁcient “priority” sectors of the economy. Similarly, large deviations in the other direc-
tion, as observed in Russia, with high increase in stock market capitalization vis-a-vis pri-
vate credit sector development have also been linked to negative outcomes.9
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
Figure 2. The marginal effect of TCI on growth conditioned on ﬁnancial structure gap, whole
sample.
Source: World Bank Financial Structure Data-set (2012 edition), UNIDO; The marginal effect
results are calculated based on obtaining the derivate of the function of growth with respect to
TCI, conditioned on different values of FSG, using the SYS GMM estimation of the growth-
TCI-FSG relationship (Table 4, speciﬁcation 1). The dotted lines show the 95% signiﬁcance
conﬁdence interval. Where both lower and upper signiﬁcance intervals fall either below or above
zero, the marginal effects should be read as signiﬁcant.
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While our results suggest that FSG has a direct negative effect on medium-term
growth on TEs, TCI does not seem to signiﬁcantly inﬂuence growth directly; instead,
we ﬁnd that a relatively small increase in TCI is associated with the reduction in the
negative effect of FSG on growth in this region. This is illustrated in Figure 3 where
the marginal effect of FSG on growth conditional on TCI is plotted against TCI. This
can be related to an increase in the productivity of the manufacturing sector after pri-
vatization and general restructuring in the early stages of transition (World Bank 2008).
As a result, the scope for ﬁnancial sector supporting loss-making large-scale vertically
integrated enterprises decreased, implying also a reduction in the problem of bad debts,
and ﬁnance assuming more growth-enhancing role, oriented towards ﬁnancing better
projects. While we expect the effect of TCI on growth to be less homogenous across
TEs, given the differences observed between CIS and CEEB economies in earlier OLS
estimations, our limited data set on ﬁnancial structure gap does not allow us to investi-
gate any differences between the CIS and CEEB subgroups, leaving this subject for
future research when data become available.
7. Conclusions
In the recent past, NSE has appeared as a credible alternative to both Washington Con-
sensus and old structuralism offering a new way of conceptualizing structural change
and growth to formulate better development policies. In this paper, we have explored
some of the basic propositions of NSE and the empirical approach used to distinguish
between CAF and CAD strategies. The effects on growth of such strategies were tested
through the relationship between TCI and growth, and a negative relationship was
established by Lin (2012).
Our analysis has conﬁrmed this result on a larger sample and for a longer time per-
iod: on average distortions as captured through a high TCI ratio are negatively related
to growth. However, we offer a number of qualiﬁcations to this proposition. First, we
ﬁnd that this result cannot be generalized to the overall group of TEs. We indeed ﬁnd a
Figure 3. The marginal effect of FSG on growth conditioned on TCI, TEs.
Source: World Bank Financial Structure Data-set (2012 edition), UNIDO; The marginal effect
results are calculated based on obtaining the derivate of the function of growth in reference to
FSG, conditioned on different values of TCI, using the SYS GMM estimation of the growth-
TCI-FSG relationship in the context of TE (Table 4, speciﬁcation 2). The dotted lines show the
95% signiﬁcance conﬁdence intervals. Where both lower and upper signiﬁcance intervals fall
either below or above zero at the same time, the marginal effects should be read as signiﬁcant.
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positive relationship between TCI and growth in CEEB and a negative relationship in
CIS countries. We interpret this result along two lines: ﬁrst, we argue that TCI does
not accurately captures distortions and their evolution in TEs, and second, we also sug-
gest that their abilities to rebuild and reorganize their economies was key to their
recovery. We also ﬁnd that this NSE proposition appears to be valid for MIC and less
so for more advanced economies, an intuitive result as the drivers of growth are likely
to differ for these two groups.
TCI and ﬁnancial sector distortions, captured via the ﬁnancial structure gap, are
negatively associated with growth overall, a moderate increase in ﬁnancial structure
gap positively moderates the negative effect of TCI on growth, suggesting some possi-
ble positive complementarities between the two. This moderating effect, however, is
insigniﬁcant for higher values of FSG. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that for TEs as a group,
FSG matters more for explaining any decline in growth than TCI directly, but
indirectly, small increases in TCI have a positive mitigating effect on the FSG-growth
relationship that we do not observe in the rest of the world.
An increase in TCI per se in TE could be attributed to a number of reasons;
underlying the complexity of TCI interpretations in the context of TE. For example, it
could be associated with a release of labour from manufacturing to try and correct for
the labour hoarding practiced under central planning. However, the inﬂexibility of
labour market regulations, and the political sensitivity of this issue meant that in a
number of countries of Commonwealth of Independent States in particular labour pro-
ductivity fell in the 1990s as a result of inability of enterprises to reduce employment
against the backdrop of a sharp output decline (World Bank 2008). This “labour
release” explanation possibly hold the key to the difference observed in the relationship
between growth and TCI in CEEB vs. CIS but may not be sufﬁcient to explain our
ﬁnancial distortions results. Similarly, given underdevelopment and shallowness of the
ﬁnancial sector over at least half of the transition period (Koivu 2004), increase in TCI
is unlikely to be driven by higher investment in capital. Therefore, we could explain a
moderate increase in TCI, and the associated positive moderating effect of this on the
FSG-growth relationship, with a possible increase in ﬁrm efﬁciency in the manufactur-
ing sector associated with enterprise restructuring and exit of inefﬁcient incumbent
ﬁrms from the market, entry of new ﬁrms and reallocation of labour across continuing
ﬁrms within the industry (World Bank 2008). Overall, this signiﬁes a move away from
a pattern of economically costly subsidizing of an oversized industrial sector towards
ﬁnance gaining a more growth-enhancing role in the region, oriented towards ﬁnancing
of smaller- to medium-scale businesses with higher productivity. Transition itself cre-
ated an opportunity to address distorted industrial and ﬁnancial structures inherited
from a planned economy (World Bank 2008).
How do we explain the limited relevance of NSE in explaining the links between
type of development strategy (CAD/CAF), ﬁnancial sector and technology choices in
TE and its robust relevance on average for a large sample of countries? There are three
groups of factors that can explain this. First, our results for TE are partial since we only
have a limited number of observations for the 1960–1980s period. This limits our abil-
ity to discuss the full evolution of TCI during central planning and transition. Second,
it is well-accepted that TEs have been over-industrialized in socialist times and have
subsequently undergone profound changes associated with de-industrialization and
restructuring. However, these proceeded at very different pace in different countries.
Hence, the varying degrees of progress in the process of industrial restructuring may
have an effect on our results and may partly explain why a very strong negative
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relationship (stronger than for the rest of the sample) between TCI and growth is found
for the CIS while a positive relationship is identiﬁed for the CEEBs. Third, the majority
of CEEBs are upper-middle to high-income economies for which NSE may only have
limited relevance. Indeed appropriate growth strategies will differ for countries at differ-
ent stages of development (Lee 2013), and NSE may speak more to developing coun-
tries than it does to more advanced economies. In particular, comparative advantage
choices for upper-middle-income economies may involve investments in intangible
assets and in R&D and knowledge-based sectors.
Based on this, more work is needed to ﬁrst ﬁne-tune our understanding of TCI
as an indicator of distortions in TEs. Second, it also appear that it would be
interesting to test the key propositions of NSE for other subgroups of countries to
complement the more nuanced picture we are painting about the relationship between
growth and TCI.
In conclusions, further research should try to resolve these issues by exploring the
propositions of NSE for speciﬁc historical sub-periods and for speciﬁc income levels
groups. In addition, construction of TCI could include value added generated in
knowledge intensive activities in addition to manufacturing.
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Notes
1. Note that in Lin (2003), a different approach was chosen and an optimal level of TCI was
constructed before measuring the deviation between the actual TCI ratio and its optimal
level. In this context, Lin indicated that distortions created to promote a capital-intensive
manufacturing sector would lead to inﬂated TCI and positive gap when compared to its opti-
mal value, while distortions created to promote a labour-intensive manufacturing sector
would depress TCI and result in a negative gap when compared to its optimal value (294).
Such an approach would also be inappropriate to capture the types of distortions existing in
TEs, as capital-intensive manufacturing and labour hoarding were promoted simultaneously
prior to transition.
2. The OECD countries included in our sample include the following countries: Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, US, United Kingdom. For the purpose of our analysis, Czech
Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, deﬁned as TEs in our sample, are excluded from this list.
3. Note that taking a natural logarithm of the absolute value of the deviation from the optimal
ﬁnancial structure gives negative values when deviations are small (between 0.00001 and
0.999), and positive values for greater deviations.
4. The income category variable is time-invariant, i.e. it is the World Bank deﬁnition based on
the latest data available.
5. Note that the key results on the relationship between TCI and growth discussed in this paper
are unaffected by the addition of these two variables, but they appear signiﬁcantly related to
growth and their addition improves the ﬁt of our models.
6. The result tables for the regressions discussed in this section have not been included in the
paper due to space limitation but they are available from the authors for an interested reader.
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7. In the light of this result, we also estimated a model testing for a non-linear relationship
between TCI and growth by reproducing our basic Model 1c presented in Table 2 adding a
quadratic term for Log of TCI, but it turned out insigniﬁcant.
8. The low number of observations in the group of low-income countries left too few degrees
of freedom for the regression results to be reliable.
9. See Gustafson 1999, 79 and Komulainen and Korhonen 2000. For a discussion of the role of
deposit insurance in manifestation of moral hazard problem in CEE and FSU countries, see
Boot and van Wijnbergen (1995, 42–57).
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